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10 Abstract This paper provides an introduction and overview for this Symposium.
11 1 Introduction
12 During the past50 years nomajor, industrialized, high-income country has suffered
13 a more remarkable reversal of economic fortune than has Japan since 1989. Japan’s
14 potential per capita real rate of GDP growth which was viewed as 4% during the
15 1980s is now seen as a little better than 1–1/2% (OECD 2005). The Bank of Japan
16 once seen as sure footed model for central banks for having insulated Japan from
17 economic impact of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1987 equity markets
18 meltdown is now viewed as clumsy (Ito 1992; Ahearne et al. 2002). In the most
19 stunning reversal of perception of all, Japan’s banks once viewed as skilled
20 practitioners of relationship banking are widely viewed today as artifacts of by-
21 gone era of protective regulation. Their future as financial intermediaries in the
22 Japan of tomorrow remains suspect.
23 The papers in this Symposium seek to shed new light on this reversal of
24 Japan’s economic fortunes even as they also make new proposals to speed
25 Japan’s recovery.
1
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University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
1These papers were originally presented at a pre-conference meeting in Tokyo in May 2004 and
in a conference at the University of Michigan in October 2004. The program of research was
sponsored jointly by the University of Michigan and the Hitotsubashi University. Funding was
provided by the Japan Foundation, Center for Global Partnership, the Economic and Social
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26 2 Macroeconomic policy
27 2.1 The disconnect between professional economists and policy-making in Japan
28 In their paper, “The Role of Preconceived Ideas in Macroeconomic Policy: Japan’s
29 Experience in Two deflationary Periods,” Koichi Hamada and Asahi Noguchi take
30 pains to point outthat the past15years isnot theonly time in the past100 years that
31 Japan has suffered severe peace-time economic difficulty. The years immediately
32 after the First World War and the 1920s were also difficult times for Japan. Hamada
33 and Noguchi see a link between the two periods. In both periods policy makers and
34 the public had a basic misunderstanding of the source of the problems facing the
35 Japanese economy and the steps needed to promote Japan’s recovery. Sadly, in
36 each case, many professional economists correctly diagnosed Japan’s situation, but
37 were unable to influence the policy process.
38 In the 1920s, Japan’s policy makers, Japan’s newspapers, the Japanese public,
39 and even Japan’s academic economists believed that a return to the gold standard at
40 the pre-World War I parity would restore strength to the economy. Only private
41 sector economists, such as Kamekichi Takahashi and Tanzan Ishibashi, fully
42 appreciated the costs Japan might face if it attempted the deflation of prices and
43 wages that required for a return to the pre-war regime. It was only after Japan
44 experienced much of these costs that policy makers were willing to change course.
45 According to Hamada and Noguchi, the roles policy makers, newspapers and
46 professional economists have played in the most recent policy debate on deflation
47 is very similar to what occurred 80 years ago. Once again, policy makers,
48 newspapers and the public for many years were very tolerant of deflation. Deflation
49 was seen as a necessary by-product of structural adjustment. For many, the more
50 deflation, the more evidence that progress was being made on the road to economic
51 recovery. Once again, economists, this time among them many academic econ-
52 omists, stood apart from this consensus. Viewing deflation as a monetary phe-
53 nomenon, they called on the Bank of Japan to adopt a highly expansionary
54 monetary policy so that Japan’s economic recovery might commence. As in 1920s,
55 in Hamada’s and Noguchi’s view it was only after Japan had experienced a long
56 period of unnecessary stagnation that both the policy makers and the public
57 changed their outlook and expansionary monetary policy commenced.
58 Hamada and Noguchi are at pains to emphasize that it was not self-interest that
59 caused policy makers and the press to champion diagnoses and policies that they
60 later learned were wrong. Rather, economists had difficulty in mobilizing support
61 for steps that ultimately proved to be entirely correct. It is possible that changes in
62 the government’s economic policy-making institutions (the creation of the Council
63 of Economic and Financial Policy in the Cabinet Office in 2001) that make it easier
64 for academic economists to participate in the critical discussions that shape policy
65 may make this less a problem in the future.
66 2.2 Price expectations and monetary policy
67 Changing price expectations are one channel through which an expansionary
68 monetary policy promoted by the Bank of Japan can fight deflation. Despite its
69 potential importance, however, there has been relatively little research in Japan on
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70 the determinants of price expectations. Hori and Shimizutani in their paper, “Price
71 Expectations of Japanese Household: Evidence from Original Survey Data” take
72 advantage of an original household-level data set to examine the factors that affect
73 price expectations, and explore how changes in price expectations can affect
74 household consumption. Their study confirms that deflationary expectations dis-
75 courage household consumption. At the same time, it seems clear that the Bank of
76 Japan’s repeated announcements of an easing of monetary policy did little to
77 change household price expectations. Only 5% to 10% of the households in the
78 Kokumin Seikatsu Monitor data set revised upwards their price expectations in
79 response. This certainly suggests that the expansionary Japanese monetary policy
80 advocated by Hamada and Noguchi labors under special handicaps.
81 2.3 A role for fiscal policy?
82 Hamada and Noguchi stress that there is a consensus among Japanese economists
83 that monetary policy is the key to Japanese recovery. While, as will be seen, there
84 are certainly exceptions to this view in Japan, in the United States quite a number of
85 influential economists have taken the position that expansionary fiscal policy also
86 has a role to play (Kuttner and Posen 2001; Hubbard 2002; Borda and Weinstein
87 2004). Ihori and Nakamoto in “Japan’s Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Reconstruction”
88 take exception to this view. Extending their earlier VAR analysis with more recent
89 data, they find no evidence that an increase in public investment or a tax cut has
90 much of expansionary impact.
2 Indeed, in the 1990s some crowding out of a
91 private investment is observed. In addition, there seems to be some evidence, given
92 Japan’s massive deficit and large outstanding public debt, that fiscal tightening,
93 rather than undermining aggregate demand, led to an increase in consumption,
94 though the magnitude is small.
95 While Ihori and Nakazato reject any role for expansionary fiscal policy, unlike
96 Hamada and Noguchi, they do see deregulation and structural adjustment, and with
97 it decline in prices in particular goods and services, as capable of promoting
98 Japanese recovery. Indeed, they find deregulation capable of having a substantial
99 greater macroeconomic impact than fiscal policy.
100 2.4 Gesell Taxes and Eisler Taxes
101 An expansionary monetary policy may be necessary to promote the Japanese
102 recovery, but it is possible such policies may not be sufficient. In the presence of
103 deflation, the inability to push nominal interest rates below zero may leave real
104 interest rates too high at this stage of Japan’s business cycle to call forth the rate of
105 investment required to assure a return Japan to full employment. Mitsuhiro Fukao
106 in “The Effects of ‘Gesell’ (Currency) Taxes in Promoting Japan’s Economy”
107 proposes a number of measures to cope with this problem. In particular, he argues
108 that the Bank of Japan should raise its price level target from zero to 1.4% per
109 annum as measured by the core consumer price index with a margin of error of plus
2See Saxonhouse and Stern (2003) for a comparison of Kuttner and Posen (2000) with Ihori
et al. (2003).
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110 or minus 1% over a three-year horizon. To achieve this end, the Bank of Japan
111 should buy large amount of market-indexed ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds) and
112 market-indexed REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts). If this measure is not ef-
113 fective, the government should break the nominal interest rate floor by levying a
114 tax on all government guaranteed financial assets.
115 Willem Buiter provides a somewhat different view in “Overcoming the Zero
116 Bound on Nominal Interest Rate: Gesell’s Currency Carry Tax vs. Eisler’s Parallel
117 Virtual Currency.” He notes that despite the zero lower bound onthe short-term rate
118 in Japan having become a binding constraint, conventional monetary policy in the
119 form of generalized open-market purchases of government securities of all
120 maturities has not been pushed to the limit where all outstanding government debt
121 and all current and future government deficits are or are confidently expected to be
122 monetized. As long as the risk-free nominal interest on financial instruments of any
123 maturity remains positive, a currency tax, in Buiter’s view is unwarranted.
124 Unlike Buiter, Fukao does not think that the massive open-market purchases of
125 long-term bonds is feasible. If the Bank of Japan holds a massive amount of long-
126 term JGBs when long-time interest rates rise it will experience a very large capital
127 loss. At the very time it is experiencing this loss, it will also be necessary for it to
128 raise short-term interest rates by mopping up excess liquidity. Fukao believes that
129 before it will be able to accomplish this completely the Bank of Japan will run out
130 of assets to sell. If it is to continue with its open-market operation it will be forced
131 to issue interest-bearing promissory notes. According to Fukao, this will result in
132 the Bank of Japan being forced to turn to the government for a subsidy.
133 In contrast, not only does Buiter feel charging negative interest on money is
134 unnecessary, he worries that it will be administratively difficult. The original
135 proposal made by Silvio Gesell that currency be stamped to indicate that it is
136 current on interest rates is feasible, but Buiter feels it will be costly and intrusive,
137 and, therefore, should only be used as a last resort. Buiter notes that a proposal
138 made by Robert Eisler in 1932 overcomes the problems of both cost and in-
139 trusiveness by unbundling the medium of exchange/means of payments function
140 from the numeraire function of money through the creation of a parallel, virtual
141 money. By controlling the exchange rate between the means of payment and the
142 numeraire, specifically by appreciating the value of the currency in terms of the
143 numeraire, monetary authorities such as the Bank of Japan, can achieve a negative
144 interest rate on the numeraire even though the interest rate on currency remains
145 constrained by the lower bound.
146 Eisler’s proposal raises the fundamental issue about who chooses or what
147 determines the numeraire used in private wage and price contracts. According to
148 Buiter, Eisler’s implicit assumption that monetary authorities can credibly deter-
149 mine the numeraire used in private wage and price contracts is shaky both a priori
150 and empirically. What might otherwise be a neat solution to a difficult problem
151 remains suspect.
152 2.5 Supply shocks and Japanese deflation
153 Asnoted, Hamada andNoguchi, in their paper for thisSymposium, dismiss therole
154 of positive supply shocks as a cause of Japan’s deflation. Indeed, they attribute the
155 long delay in Japan’s recovery to the mistaken view that Japan’s deflation reflects
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156 an acceleration of technological progress. In his contribution to this Symposium,
157 “Good Deflation/Bad Deflation and Japanese Economic Recovery,” Saxonhouse,
158 following Bordo et al. (2004), notes that, whatever the current situation in Japan,
159 economic history certainly suggests that technological progress can go hand in
160 hand with general deflation. Conducting a VAR analysis using very detailed in-
161 formation about the components of Japan’s consumer price index, Saxonhouse
162 finds that short-run shocks to Japan’s relative price structure persist in the long run.
163 Given this finding, he concludes that such shocks are real in origin and reflect
164 technological change. As noeffort has yetbeen completed to show thefull extent to
165 which technological change is driving short-run relative price change in Japan
166 compared with other factors, and the full extent to which relative price changes are
167 driving aggregate price change compared with other factors, the policy impli-
168 cations of Saxonhouse’s findings are unclear. Nevertheless, they may provide some
169 support for Ihori’s and Nakamoto’s view on the relationship between deregulation
170 and macroeconomic improvement. What is clear, however, is that it is a mistake to
171 dismiss out of hand the possibility that technological shocks are playing an im-
172 portant role among other forces in Japan’s current deflation.
173 3 Macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate
174 3.1 Intervention policy and exchange rate changes
175 In the debate over whether non-standard monetary policies, such as those discussed
176 by Mitsuhiro Fukao and Buiter are needed, it is sometimes forgotten that
177 unsterilized exchange rate intervention remains a monetary tool that can be used to
178 stimulate the Japanese economy (Svensson 2001, 2003). Takatoshi Ito’s paper,
179 “Interventions and Japanese Economic Recovery” and Rasmus Fatum’s and
180 Michael Hutchison’s paper, “Foreign Exchange Rate Intervention and Monetary
181 Policy in Japan, 2003–04,” both examine the rationale behind the massive increase
182 in foreign exchange market intervention in 2003–2004 and evaluate its effective-
183 ness in promoting an external value of the yen and a change in the money supply
184 that supported Japanese economic recovery. Using different approaches, both
185 papers document the dramatic change in intervention that commenced in Japan in
186 January 2003 and continued until March 2003. During these 14 months 3.5 trillion
187 yen (7% of GDP) in interventions were conducted. Unlike interventions conducted
188 in the preceding six years when Eisuke Sakakibara and Haruhiko Kuroda were
189 Vice Ministers for International Finance at the Ministry of Finance, these in-
190 terventions were both frequent and unannounced. While agreeing on the outline of
191 the changes in policy, Ito and Fatum-Hutchinson disagree to as to whether in-
192 tervention policy was effective in preventing the yen appreciation that a fragile
193 Japanese economy battling deflation could ill afford. Ito estimates a reaction
194 function explaining Japanese intervention. He finds that the unannounced in-
195 terventions in 2003–2004 might have been larger because they were not as
196 effective yen-for-yen as the announced intervention during the Sakakibara-Kuroda
197 period. Nevertheless, by selling 3.5 trillion yen Ito finds that the Japanese
198 authorities achieved a yen–dollar range from 105 to 115 in Spring–Summer 2004,
199 instead of the range 90 to 100 that he feels would otherwise have prevailed. In other
200 words, Ito finds that a 13.3% depreciation was achieved by “leaning against” the
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201 market when the yen was appreciating, and “leaning in” the market when the yen
202 was depreciating.
203 While agreeing with Ito that intervention was effective during the Sakakibara-
204 Kuroda period, Fatum and Hutchison find the massive interventions of 2003 in-
205 effective and the massive interventions of early 2004 actually pushing the yen in
206 the wrong direction. Fatum and Hutchison suggest that other studies of exchange
207 rate intervention by Japanese monetary authorities have found different results
208 possibly because they are contaminated by sample selection bias. Intervention
209 typically occurs during periods of abnormal exchange rate movements and not
210 when normal exchange rate market conditions prevail. To get around this problem
211 they match-up cases where economic circumstances were in every regard the same
212 except that in one case intervention occurred and in the other it did not. It is from an
213 analysis of these cases that Fatum and Hutchison draw their conclusions about the
214 effectiveness of intervention policy.
215 Fatum and Hutchison also explore the hypothesis that the reduced effectiveness
216 of the intervention over the 2003–2004 period compared with the Sakakibara-
217 Kuroda period is related to the degree of sterilization. Did increased sterilization
218 mean a decline in the effectiveness of intervention? Interventions carried out by the
219 Bank of Japan on behalf of the Ministry of Finance are automatically sterilized
220 since the Ministry of Finance must first raise the necessary funds for foreign
221 exchange purchases by selling yen-denominated bills in the domestic market. The
222 real question is what action, if any, does the Bank of Japan take to unsterilize the
223 intervention? Fatum and Hutchison find that the Bank of Japan has not allowed
224 Ministry of Finance interventions to influence the day-to-day conduct of monetary
225 policy. In addition, they find no evidence that the Bank of Japan responded to
226 intervention action by the Ministry of Finance in 2003–2004 by increasing base
227 money at a rate faster than it might otherwise have done. Indeed, cumulative
228 foreign currency purchases by the Ministry of Finance were more than twice as
229 large as the increases in base money engineered by the Bank of Japan. The Bank of
230 Japan on its own was attempting to stimulate the economy in 2003–2004 through
231 rapid base-money growth, but this does not seem to have been influenced by the
232 exchange rate intervention policy of the Ministry of Finance. Much of this
233 intervention remained sterilized, in Fatum’s and Hutchinson’s view, perhaps
234 accounting for its lack of effectiveness.
235 3.2 Exchange rate change and economic performance
236 Unlike Ito, Ronald McKinnon rejects the use of exchange rate change as a tool for
237 economic adjustment. In “Exchange Rate or Wage Changes in International
238 Adjustment? Japan and China versus the United States,” he notes American-spon-
239 sored exchange rate adjustment has wreaked havoc with the Japanese economy in
240 thepast, and will do so again in China and Japan today if they succumb today to US
241 pressure. McKinnon believes US government officials are mistaken if they believe
242 exchange rate adjustment will significantly alter international economic imbal-
243 ances. A yen or renminbi appreciation will raise the price of Japanese or Chinese
244 goods and services relative to foreign goods and services, discouraging their pur-
245 chases, but the appreciation also has a deflationary impact because of the loss in
246 value of the dollar assets each of these countries hold. As a result, the net impact of
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247 an appreciation is indeterminant. In McKinnon’s view the history of US–Japanese
248 economic relations over the past 30 years makes very clear that yen appreciation
249 did not have any lasting impact on the structural surplus in Japan’s international
250 accounts. At the same time, this appreciation imposed a deflationary bias on
251 monetary policy ultimately pushing Japan into a liquidity trap from which it has yet
252 to emerge. New demands emanating from the United States that Japan further
253 appreciate the yen even while it is continuing to experience deflation make little
254 sense to McKinnon. Moreover, he fears that intense US pressure now to break of
255 the peg between the renminbi and the dollar will push China down the same
256 unhappy path that Japan has gone.
257 In preference to using exchange rate changes to mitigate international economic
258 imbalances, McKinnon believes that not only the renminbi but all currencies in
259 East Asia, including the yen, should be pegged to the dollar. If each country’s
260 monetary policy permits nominal wage growth to reflect increases in productivity,
261 international adjustment will take care of itself far more readily than is the case
262 under today’s ad hoc regime.
263 3.3 Monetary regimes and stabilization policy
264 While McKinnon argues for the superiority of the dollar peg system on medium
265 and long-term grounds, the model constructed by Koichi Kamada and Izumi
266 Takagawa in their paper, “Deepening Interdependence in the Asian-Pacific Region:
267 An Empirical Study Using a Macro-Econometric Model” is able to test a dollar peg
268 system versus other regimes over shorter-time horizons. Insofar as coping with
269 economic crises are concerned, Kamada and Takagawa find that a currency-basket
270 regime is clearly superior to both dollar-peg system advocated by McKinnon as
271 well as the current ad hoc regime. This is true for China and Japan, as well as for
272 most other countries in East Asia. At least on short-run stabilization policy
273 grounds, a regime where all countries peg their currencies to the dollar is worse for
274 many countries in East Asia, not only compared to a regime where all countries peg
275 to a currency basket, but also to the present regime.
276 4 Banking, structural adjustment and Japanese economic performance
277 4.1 Government policy and the banking system
278 Even if the Bank of Japan had pursued a highly expansionary money policy in the
279 mid and late 1990s it is by no means that a recovery of the Japanese economy
280 would have ensued. By that time the balance sheets of Japanese banks had de-
281 teriorated to such an extent that the conventional monetary transmission system
282 had broken down (Bernanke 2000). If banks will not lend simply increasing a
283 supply of base money will do little to stimulate the economy. In his paper, “Reform
284 of the Japanese Banking System,” Kawai investigates how Japanese banks ceased
285 to be effective financial intermediaries and the role that government policy has
286 played in the banking sector’s distress and slow recovery.
287 The asset-price bubble in the late 1980s and its subsequent collapse were
288 largely responsible for the emergence of non-performing loans (NPLs) and the
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289 banking sector problem. Nevertheless, the situation was exacerbated, Kawai
290 argues, by the absence of a tradition of assessing and pricing the risks in lending to
291 particular borrowers. This was an important factor in the over-extension of col-
292 lateral-based but risky loans. And the entire problem was made even worse by the
293 banks operating within a very weak prudential and supervisory framework.
294 Kawai finds that the absence of a comprehensive strategy addressing the
295 banking sector problem when it first emerged was clearly a mistake that allowed a
296 systemic banking crisis to emerge in 1997–1998 to be followed by a large output
297 loss during 1998–2002. Japan’s financial authorities underestimated the nature and
298 seriousness of the problem, had unwarranted expectations of renewed growth that
299 they hoped would restore asset values and bank balance sheets, and continued
300 fiscal expansion to support aggregate demand that allowed insolvent banks to
301 survive thereby delaying resolution of the problem.
302 The 1997–1998 crisis did prompt the government to take more aggressive and
303 decisive measures. Kawai notes that there has been some progress on banking
304 sector restructuring through the closing or temporary nationalization of non-viable
305 banks, tighter loan classification and loan provisioning, and the acceleration of
306 NPL disposal. The worst may be over, but there remain significant risks con-
307 centrated in regional and smaller banks that are vulnerable to weak local condi-
308 tions, persistent deflation, and increases in the long-term interest rate.
309 4.2 What role for Japan’s Banks
310 The regulatory framework that was in place for much of the second half of the last
311 century in Japan put the banking system at the center of resource allocation. Kyoji
312 Fukao, Kiyohiko G. Nishimura, Qing-Yuan Sui and Masayo Tomiyama in their
313 paper “Japanese Bank Monitoring Activities and the Performance of Borrower
314 Firms 1981–1996” attempt to assess empirically the contributions made by
315 Japanese banks. They find that after 1981, following widespread organizational
316 changes, both the resources devoted to and the quality of what bank monitoring
317 was done declined. While there remained a positive association between bank
318 monitoring and firm profitability, this was mostly due to the banks choosing the
319 most profitable loan applicants rather than because banks in any significant way
320 provided advice that enhanced the profitability of their borrowers. It is a measure of
321 the current low esteem in which banks are held that even the result that they are
322 able to successfully screen loan applicants seems surprising and is at variance with
323 the conclusions drawn by Kawai. Even so, if Japanese banks are to play an
324 important role in Japan’s economy in the future they will in all likelihood need to
325 have a monitoring function that does provide value-added to their borrowers.
326 This last point is underlined by the results in the paper by Alan Ahearne and
327 Naoki Shinada, “Zombie Firms and Economic Stagnation in Japan”. Zombie firms
328 are debt-ridden companies that, despite their dismal performance, continue to re-
329 ceive financial support from borrowers who at some earlier time viewed them as
330 safe, profitable borrowers. Measured productivity growth of these firms has tended
331 to be well below the average for the rest of the economy, or even negative, putting
332 a significant drag on the productivity performance of the Japanese economy as
333 a whole. Worse, Ahearne and Shinada find that in the construction, wholesale,
334 and retailing sectors where there are large concentrations of zombie firms the
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335 reallocation of resources is going perversely from productive to unproductive
336 firms. The continuing support of these zombie firms by Japan’s banks is an
337 important factor in the banking sector’s poor performance. Ahearne and Shinada
338 argue that banks should be provided with incentives to withdraw their support,
339 and force firms to meaningfully restructure or, in some cases, to close.
340 5 Some difficulties posed by recovery
341 Despite the two middle quarters of 2004 experiencing negative growth, Japan is
342 once again in the midst of a fragile recovery as it has been on at least in five other
343 occasions in the past 15 years. This latest recovery is somewhat different from
344 some of those in the recent past because, notwithstanding continuing deflation, it is
345 being driven by domestic consumption and non-residential private investment, and
346 not by exports. Even so, Japan’s sustained escape from economic stagnation is
347 fraught with difficulties. As the papers in this Symposium discuss in detail mac-
348 roeconomic policy, international finance, and the banking system, individually and
349 together, pose major problems for the future of Japan’s economy.
350 The very large volume of outstanding government debt as a proportion of GDP
351 makes it likely that as the Japanese economy attempts a sustained recovery, long-
352 term interest rates on government debt will rise. The most immediate impact of this
353 rise in interest rates will be on the Japanese banking system’s balance sheet.
354 Japanese banks have returned to profitability and the nominal value of their
355 outstanding NPLs is declining. Nevertheless, there continues to be a contraction in
356 bank lending (OECD 2005). In consequence, Japanese government debt continues
357 to be an important part of the banking sector’s assets. As noted by both Kawai and
358 Mitsuhiro Fukao, a rise in interest rates will impose a significant capital loss on the
359 Japanese banking system. What has been gained after long effort from the writing
360 offof NPLs, the unraveling of cross-holding equity relationships between borrower
361 and lender, and the infusion of government capital may be quickly lost.
3
362 The likely rise in long-term interest rates will do more than just pose difficulties
363 for the banking system. Because of the government’s very large outstanding debt,
364 the rise in rates not only reflects, but also reinforces public concern about the
365 sustainability of Japan’s fiscal position. At the very time that new government
366 expenditures might be needed to shore up the banking system, however, the im-
367 peratives of public finance require, as Ihori observes, a continuing paring of ex-
368 penditures and a raising of revenues.
369 The likely rise in interest rates will complicate Japan’s recovery on yet a third
370 front. Rising rates in Japan will put still further pressure on the yen to appreciate. If
371 Ito is correct, the Ministry of Finance has the tools to cope with this problem, but
372 McKinnon suggests that in the face of American counter-pressure, the political will
373 to intervene cannot always be counted upon. Fatum’s and Hutchison’s findings,
374 however, imply that even if the political will is there a good outcome is not assured.
375 The difficulties just outlined can be mitigated by continued, credible gov-
376 ernment steps towards fiscal consolidation that aims, as Ihori suggests, at the
3Saxonhouse and Stern (2003) discuss how the US Treasury and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System dealt with a similar problem in the 1940s and what lessons Japan might
learn from this experience.
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377 elimination of Japan’s primary government deficit, and the creation of a modest
378 surplus. In an environment of less than robust aggregate demand must be skillfully
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